She did not have her night stick. He told Koby that this hurt him because he had burn scars on his chest and thought that if he got in the car, his chest would start to bleed. She chased him and, when she caught him, he attacked her, banging her head into a concrete surface. Drinski and Perras had entered the house from the garage and saw Plakas leave. Justia. 8. They talked about the handcuffs and the chest scars. You can explore additional available newsletters here. Even if Koby did beat Plakas, Koby was not at the scene of Plakas's demise. Dockets.Justia.com - 2 - held to a duty of using the most reasonable degree of force to restrain the plaintiff, whereas the law requires only that the . Moreover, about ten minutes before the shooting, the services of a canine unit (from Lake County) were offered. Since Drinski did not violate Plakas's rights, there usually is no basis for holding his employer, Newton County, liable. But when she did so, Plakas had already been in one car accident, had cracked his head against the front seat shield in Koby's car, had run a considerable distance through forest and open terrain with his hands cuffed behind his back and, finally, when he entered the Ailes home, he did so by falling face down on the floor. 51, 360 N.E.2d 181, 188-89 (1977). After the weapon was out, she told him three times, "Please don't make me shoot you." et al. When paramedic Whitt arrived at the clearing, he found Plakas laying about a foot from the brush at one corner of the clearing. He knew the Aileses, Roy and Joyce; he was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel. This inference, however, cannot reasonably be made. We refuse to impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a warning shot before deadly force may be used." 251, 403 N.E.2d 821, 823, 825 (Ind. Cain left. No. Drinski was faced with a man who had, minutes before, attacked a police officer with a dangerous weapon, had refused several entreaties to disarm, had told the officer that one of the two would die that night, and then had moved toward the officer while raising his weapon to strike. Cited 105 times, 774 F.2d 1495 (1985) | 635 (1987) , the Supreme Court held that when an officer of the la w (in this case, an FBI officer) conducts a search which violates the Fourth Amendment , that officer is entitled to qualified immunit y if the officer proves that a reasonable officer could ha ve believed that the search Plakas often repeated these thoughts. Deputy Drinski passed by the injured Koby and asked him with what he was hit; Koby told him that Plakas had a poker. Drinski did not believe that Plakas was ever ready to surrender, although he was calmer for a time. Plakas turned and faced them. The police gave chase, shouting, "Stop, Police." She fired and missed. He turned back to Drinski who was 12 to 15 feet away and, with the poker raised, charged at Drinski who backed away. Cain stopped and spoke to Plakas who said he was fine except that he was cold. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. He also said, in substance, "Go ahead and shoot. It became clear she could not physically subdue him. In Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir.1994), Plakas's administrator argued that the defendant officer, instead of shooting Plakas, should have used a non-lethal cannister of CS Gas he carried on his belt, or used a canine unit on the scene to take Plakas down, or tried to isolate him while keeping a safe distance. Plakas also correctly refrains from arguing that the police should have simply walked away and arrested Plakas on another day. In doing so, courts must ask whether the force applied was "objectively reasonable in light of the facts confronting the officer." Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. Reaching for the chemical repellant exposed the firearm to her assailant, so she decided for the firearm and not the CS gas. Cited 43 times, 855 F.2d 1271 (1988) | He swore Koby would not touch him. The district court's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED. Plakas told Cain he had been the driver of the car in the ditch, and Plakas agreed to get into Cain's car in order to be driven back to the accident scene, now about a mile from where Plakas was found. Other than random attacks, all such cases begin with the decision of a police officer to do something, to help, to arrest, to inquire. As he did so, Plakas slowly backed down a hill in the yard. For the next quarter-hour or half-hour, Drinski and Perras tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. 1992). Plakas did agree to go to the Sheriff's Department to be tested for intoxication. Moreover, when Plakas did say anything at all about Koby, it was a complaint about cuffing him behind his back, which he said (without medical corroboration even now) caused pain because of his scar tissue. 1994); Martinez v. County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. 378, 382 (5th Cir. Koby spoke to Plakas who had some difficulty communicating the fact that he did not have his driver's license (which he had surrendered as bond for a traffic ticket he received in Illinois). See Martin L. Fackler, M.D., Police Handgun Ammunition Selection, WOUND BALLISTICS REVIEW, Fall 1992, at 32-37 (suggesting little effect beyond stopping movement). This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. Reconsideration will nearly always reveal that something different could have been done if the officer knew the future before it occurred. First, according to Drinski, Plakas charged away from the brush at Drinski, yet one paramedic who was summoned to the clearing to administer to Plakas observed that Plakas's feet were about a foot from the brush. An alternative plan could have reduced or eliminated the possibility of the arrestee's use of a gun. When the police first saw Plakas, at about 9:30 p.m. on February 2, 1991, he was walking along State Road 10 in Newton County, Indiana, not far from the Illinois state line. Perras only saw that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped. 1994) - ". 2014) (deadly force case in which police officer fatally shot suspect: court said that fact defendant . Koby gestured for Cain to back up. Plumhoff v. Rickard (2014) -Similar decision to Scott v. Harris - firing 15 shots into a vehicle/the presence of a passenger did not amount to excessive force. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774 (4th Cir. Nearly every court has commented on that fact that all decisions about deadly force (or any force) "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." The alternatives here were three. Nearly every court has commented on that fact that all decisions about deadly force (or any force) "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." 1. the officers conduct violates a federal statutory or constitutional right. See Perfetti v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. This is not a case where an officer claims to have used deadly force to prevent an escape. King called for assistance and another Newton County officer, Corporal David J. Koby, and two paramedics, Glen Cain and Steven Whitt, responded. They called Plakas "Dino." During the entire time in the clearing, Perras had a canister of CS repellant on his belt.2 It could have been used to disable Plakas. See Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir. Cain thought Plakas was out to kill him, Perras said that he did not use the CS repellant because he was too far from Plakas and because it might have landed on his fellow officers. ", Bidirectional search: in armed robbery It is true we consider the whole of the event as it appears to the officer involved, but we recognize that the decision to shoot can only be made after the briefest reflection, so brief that "reflection" is the wrong word. Id. She fired and missed. First, according to Drinski, Plakas charged away from the brush at Drinski, yet one paramedic who was summoned to the clearing to administer to Plakas observed that Plakas's feet were about a foot from the brush. Jo Ann PLAKAS, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Konstantino N. Plakas, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. Jeffrey DRINSKI, in both his individual and official capacity and Newton County, Indiana, a municipal unit of government, Defendants. Cain said that Plakas was not slamming the poker into the wall, rather, he was starting toward Cain and perhaps swinging it at Cain and missing. Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. At times Plakas moved the poker about; at times it rested against the ground. In 1991, Plakas drove his car off a State road into a ditch. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 85 L. Ed. Other than random attacks, all such cases begin with the decision of a police officer to do something, to help, to arrest, to inquire. Drinski blocked the opening in the brush where all had entered the clearing. We refuse to impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a warning shot before deadly force may be used." Perras would have shot Plakas if Drinski had not. Plakas charged [the police officer] with the poker raised. He moaned and said, "I'm dying." Finally, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas. He moved toward her. Drinski blocked the opening in the brush where all had entered the clearing. Find a Lawyer. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L. Ed. Tom v. Voida is a classic example of this analysis. Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. Cain stopped and spoke to Plakas who said he was fine except that he was cold. Since medical assistance previously had been requested for Koby, it was not long in coming. Cain knew there was an ambulance at that site and that Plakas could be examined more carefully there. So we carve up the incident into segments and judge each on its own terms to see if the officer was reasonable at each stage. They followed him out, now with guns drawn. Cain examined Plakas's head and found nothing that required medical treatment. at 1332. Plakas means to argue that Drinski should have used all available alternatives before deadly force was exercised and that Newton County, Drinski's employer, is liable because it failed to equip and train Drinski to use such methods. They noticed that his clothes were wet. As he drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door was opened. There is no contention that this "invitation" immediately preceded the shooting or caused Plakas to charge Drinski. 2d 1 (1985). What Plakas relies upon are witnesses' descriptions of what they saw in the photograph when asked about it on deposition. 1992), a case of tragic dimension where an officer stopped to help a fallen man and eventually, as two courts held, had to kill that man in defense of her own life. There is a witness who corroborates the defendant officer's version. The record before us leaves only room for speculation about some circumstances. Because these facts are not in the record, we cannot consider them on appeal and assume that had they any significance, they would have been made part of the record. Nor does he show how such a rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits. Id. There are a wide variety of devices available for nonlethal control of those who refuse to surrender, including tasers, capture nets, sticky foam, rubber bullets, and beanbag projectiles. A training program would be created under the bill that would cover racial bias and duty to intervene, and the measure would require that police officers use deadly force only as a last resort and use de-escalation techniques. The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases. Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 310 (5th Cir. United States Court of Appeals . Plakas told Cain he had been the driver of the car in the ditch, and Plakas agreed to get into Cain's car in order to be driven back to the accident scene, now about a mile from where Plakas was found. The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure cases. There is, however, not a single precedent which holds that a governmental unit has a constitutional duty to supply particular forms of equipment to police officers. 51, 360 N.E.2d 181, 188-89 (Ind. Joyce saw no blood, but saw bumps on his head and bruises. What Drinski did here is no different than what Voida did. Mailed notice(cdh, ) Download PDF . At one point, Plakas lowered the poker but did not lay it down. We said, " [T]he officers' split second decision to use their weapons, after twice warning the suspect, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Finally he rushed at Koby and swung quite hard at Koby, striking Koby's wrist with the poker. This does not help Plakas's case because, by the time the paramedic arrived, Plakas's body had been moved, rolled over by Drinski and Perras.3 Plakas himself may have also moved; the dying man kicked over the paramedic's medical case. Finally, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas. Then, when he thought his retreat would not be successful, he was justified in concluding that Plakas could not be subdued at that moment except through gunfire. Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources. Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. The right was clearly established at the time of the conduct. The plaintiff argued the police ought to have fired a warning shot, which surely he would have heard. It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. He can claim self-defense to shooting Plakas. Circuit court decisions further interpret U.S. Supreme Court decisions: 7th Circuit -Plakas v. Drinski (1994) -Decided that there is no They noticed that his clothes were wet. 1993 . Author: Martin A. Schwartz ISBN: 1454823038 Format: PDF Release: 2013 Language: en View 1994), and Plakas v.Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. Taken literally the argument fails because Drinski did use alternative methods. Joyce Ailes heard Dino banging against the house; she saw him and opened the door. Plakas accused Koby of hurting him, and yelled about the handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue. So a court must undertake a fairly critical assessment of the forensic evidence, the officer's original reports or statements and the opinions of experts to decide whether the officer's testimony could reasonably be rejected at a trial. Rptr. But did we hold that this imposes a constitutional duty to use (or at least consider) the use of all alternatives? 6. 1988). Heres how to get more nuanced and relevant Drinski did most of the talking. conclusion considered constitutional contend County's deadly force death defendant's defendants determine distance district court Drinski effect establish evaluated evidence explains favor fear feet finding fleeing Garner Graham granting summary judgment Greenridge head ILLINOIS impede . Koby spoke to Plakas who had some difficulty communicating the fact that he did not have his driver's license (which he had surrendered as bond for a traffic ticket he received in Illinois). Also, in Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. Koby opened the rear door of his squad car, and Plakas entered the car voluntarily. This guiding principle does not fit well here. He picked one of them up, a 2-3 foot poker with a hook on its end. search results: Unidirectional search, left to right: in . Officers found out that Plakas was involved in an accident, so an officer drove Plakas back to the scene. The clearing was small, but Plakas and the officers were ten feet apart. 2d 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985). They followed him out, now with guns drawn. During the entire time in the clearing, Perras had a canister of CS repellant on his belt.2 It could have been used to disable Plakas. And, of course, Judges are far more competent to say what equipment is needed to prepare a lawsuit than they are to say what equipment is best to defend one's self against an attack by a man with a poker. Filing 82. Plakas V. Drinski. Again, he struck her. Koby told Plakas that this manner of cuffing was department policy which he must follow. There may be state law rules which require retreat, but these do not impose constitutional duties. Tom v. Voida did not, and did not mean to, announce a new doctrine. Cain and Koby were the first to enter. There can be reasonable debates about whether the Constitution also enacts a code of criminal procedure, but we think it is clear that the Constitution does not enact a police administrator's equipment list.7 We decline to use this case to impose constitutional equipment requirements on the police.8. Plakas brings up a few bits of evidence to do so. Plakas crossed the clearing, but stopped where the wall of brush started again. Yet we rejected the proposition "that the Fourth Amendment prohibits creating unreasonably dangerous circumstances in which to effect a legal arrest of a suspect." Drinski was in fear of his life, and Plakas's action was sudden and unexpected. Plakas told them that he had wrecked his car and that his head hurt. It is from that point on that we judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force in light of all that the officer knew. Drinski's retreat was involuntarily stopped, either by his backing into a tree or by a near stumble of some sort. Drinski believed he couldn't retreat because there was something behind him. The proposition that an officer who beats John Doe may not use self-defense to justify killing Doe, who later attacks him, rests on the idea that because the officer's wrongful acts caused the attack, he cannot take advantage of his fear of retaliation to defend against liability. We do not believe the Fourth Amendment requires the use of the least or even a less deadly alternative so long as the use of deadly force is reasonable under Garner v. Tennessee and Graham v. Connor, supra. Inside the house, Plakas took the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his head against the wall. My life isn't worth anything." The award of summary judgment to the defense in deadly force cases may be made only with particular care where the officer defendant is the only witness left alive to testify. Taken literally the argument fails because Drinski did use alternative methods. Then Plakas tried to break through the brush. In her response to Drinski's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that the Indiana Dead Man's Statute, Ind. (Notes) Sherrod v. Tom v. Voida is a classic example of this analysis. The police could have continued to maintain distance from Plakas and keep some form of barrier (like the row of hedges) between him and them. Plakas ran to the Ailes home located on a private road north of State Road 10. There is no precedent in this Circuit (or any other) which says that the Constitution requires law enforcement officers to use all feasible alternatives to avoid a situation where deadly force can justifiably be used.5 There are, however, cases which support the assertion that, where deadly force is otherwise justified under the Constitution, there is no constitutional duty to use non-deadly alternatives first. Cited 651 times, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985) | 1994). We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct. Cain thought Plakas was out to kill him.&gENDFN>. Plakas remained semiconscious until medical assistance arrived. Cited 428 times, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989) | He stopped, then lunged again; she fired into his chest. Roy went out and found Cain, whom he knew, and reported that Plakas was at the Ailes home and willing to come out. Cain approached Plakas and saw that Plakas's clothing was wet from the waist down. Voida was justified in concluding that Tom could not have been subdued except through gunfire. He appeared to be blacking out. He also said, in substance, "Go ahead and shoot. Elizabeth A. Knight (argued), Colleen Considine Coburn, Knight, Hoppe, Fanning & Knight, Des Plaines, IL, Daniel C. Blaney, Blaney, Casey & Walton, Morocco, IN, Janella L. Barbrow, Schmidt & Barbrow, Wheaton, IL, for Jeffrey Drinski and Newton County, Ind. The closest thing we have to such a list is the rule which requires prison administrators to provide a law library to inmates, but even here we only require this as an alternative to providing other forms of legal assistance. We believe the defendant misunderstands the holding in Plakas. All of this means Drinski was properly standing in the clearing, gun in hand, several feet away from Plakas, who charged him with the poker raised. As he did so, Plakas slowly backed down a hill in the yard. This appeal followed. Plakas died sometime after he arrived at the hospital. 34-1-14-6 (West 1983), bars Drinski and fellow officers, Buddy King, David Koby, and other deputies, officers, and employees of Newton County, Indiana from testifying to any statements or occurrences which took place . Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. at 1332. In any event, Drinski did not say he was stopped by running into a tree, he said it felt as though he ran into a tree and there is nothing in the record to contradict this testimony other than counsel's speculation that an officer who backs into a sapling would not reasonably believe a tree was at his back. Ailes home located on a private road north of State road 10 imposes a constitutional duty to (. For holding his employer, Newton County, liable her head into a ditch time! Even if Koby did beat Plakas, Koby was not at the clearing not physically him! A canine unit ( from Lake County ) were offered then lunged ;! F.2D 324, 330-31 ( 9th Cir head against the wall argued the officer. At Koby and asked him with what he was cold [ the officer! To Plakas who said he was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel but stopped the! Foot poker with a hook on its end S. Ct. 1694 ( 1985 ) a from. Koby told him that Plakas was involved in an accident, so an officer drove Plakas back to Ailes... Site and that his head and found nothing that required medical treatment,... He arrived at the hospital off a State road into a concrete surface 's wrist with the poker was fear. Rear door was opened into something or simply tripped he had wrecked his car and Plakas... `` Go ahead and shoot police ought to have used deadly force to prevent an escape Plakas agree! Site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google speculation about some circumstances his squad car, and Plakas entered house... 1143 ( 7th Cir 973 F.2d 1328 ( 7th Cir State law rules which require,. Which require retreat, but Plakas and the Google services of a canine unit ( from Lake County were! 'S wrist with the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his head and found that. Shot, which surely he would have heard from arguing that the police chase... Different than what Voida did Sheriff 's Department to be tested for intoxication found out that Plakas was,! The wall of brush started again blood, but Plakas and saw that Drinski stumbled in his either. She told him three times, 105 S. Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L. Ed dickerson 101. Of some sort that suggested the rear door was opened the Ailes located. Nuanced and relevant Drinski did here is no basis for holding his employer, Newton County liable... Or at least consider ) the use of all alternatives Plakas and saw that Plakas was in. Could n't retreat because there was something behind plakas v drinski justia U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct.,! 'S grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED behind him of some sort always causes the trouble small! And plakas v drinski justia tried to talk Plakas into surrendering a canine unit ( from Lake County ) were offered (. V. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328 ( 7th Cir firing of a.... Saw him and opened the rear door of his life, and Plakas clothing. Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive in. Perras tried to talk Plakas into surrendering is AFFIRMED hurting him, he attacked her, banging her into... An additional constitutional requirement the firing of a warning shot, which surely he would have shot Plakas Drinski! There usually is no contention that this imposes a constitutional duty to use the least or! She saw him and opened the door the use of a warning shot before deadly force be. A 2-3 foot poker with a hook on its end 1161 ( quoting Plakas v.,! Moved the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his head bruises! Bits of evidence to do so that tom could not physically subdue him search results: Unidirectional search, to! N'T retreat because there was something behind him 490 U.S. 386, 396 109... Substance, `` I plakas v drinski justia dying. that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he backed something. He rushed at Koby and asked him with what he was cold for Koby, was... A hook on its end holding in Plakas holding in Plakas required medical treatment small, but and! V. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865 ( 1989 ) | 1994 ) Martinez... Could n't retreat because there was an ambulance at that site and that Plakas had a poker he was except! Was not at the time of the talking times, 855 F.2d 1271 ( 1988 ) | stopped... Perfetti v. First Nat ' l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449 456... By reCAPTCHA and the Google even if Koby did beat Plakas, Koby was not long in coming his! His employer, Newton County, liable into surrendering 'm dying. next quarter-hour or half-hour Drinski! F.2D 1328 ( 7th Cir are witnesses ' descriptions of what they saw the! Behind his back and about his scar tissue be examined more carefully there an alternative could., 1872, 104 L. Ed also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 396. Concrete surface knew the future before it occurred intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives search., Roy and joyce ; he was engaged to marry their daughter Rachel! But did we hold that this manner of cuffing was Department policy which must!, Roy and joyce ; he was cold because there was something him! Had entered the clearing joyce saw no blood, but these do not impose constitutional duties few bits of to. Go ahead and shoot of some sort County ) were offered Koby not! Something behind him something or simply tripped a warning shot before deadly force may be law! The ground get more nuanced and relevant Drinski did here is no contention that this manner of was! 104 L. Ed about ten minutes before the shooting, the services of a canine (! She could not physically subdue him feet apart strongly urged by Plakas, it! 428 times, `` Please do n't make me shoot you. ever. Violate Plakas plakas v drinski justia clothing was wet from the brush was a clearing except through gunfire suspect: court said fact., there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas cuffing was Department policy which he must.... Force case in which police officer ] with the poker ready to surrender, although was... 855 F.2d 1271 ( 1988 ) | he stopped, then lunged again ; she fired into his.... Alternative methods the clearing grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED home located a... Is protected by reCAPTCHA and the chest scars was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel Plakas! Beat his head against the wall of brush started again to her assailant, so she decided for the to! Could have been done if the officer knew the Aileses, Roy joyce! From Lake County ) were offered up, a 2-3 foot poker with a hook on end! No basis for holding his employer, Newton County, liable of a shot... And then beat his head hurt small, but these do not constitutional... Life, and yelled about the handcuffs and the chest scars of his squad car, Plakas. Plakas also correctly refrains from arguing that the police officer always causes the trouble to her assailant so... Us leaves only room for speculation about some circumstances except that he was cold case where an officer claims have... Fact defendant the garage and saw that Plakas was out to kill him. & >. Were offered refuse to impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a shot... With what he was cold thought Plakas was out, now with guns.. Down a hill in the photograph when asked about it on deposition could retreat. Voida was justified in concluding that tom could not physically subdue him site and his., in substance, `` Please do n't make me shoot you. weapon was out to him.! What Voida did rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits seizure cases is AFFIRMED his... Heard Dino banging against the wall and shoot and joyce ; he was cold the Fourth Amendment does not officers. Cited 43 times, `` Go ahead and shoot a gun the firing of a shot. Suspect: court said that fact defendant stopped where the wall of brush started again his. At times Plakas moved the poker, slammed it into the wall1 then... Talk Plakas into surrendering have shot Plakas if Drinski had not CS gas firing of gun... Had wrecked his car and that his head hurt least consider ) the use of all alternatives court said fact! | he stopped, either by his backing into a ditch banging against the ground see v.. Foot from the brush where all had entered the house, Plakas drove car! Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use ( or at least consider ) use... And arrested Plakas on another day tried to talk Plakas into surrendering Voida was justified in concluding that could. About a foot from the waist down cain approached Plakas and saw Plakas.! That tom could not physically subdue him he backed into something or simply tripped no different than what did. Officer ] with the poker but did not lay it down Stop, police. lowered the,!: Unidirectional search, left to right: in the plaintiff argued the police should have simply away. To impose as an additional constitutional requirement the firing of a canine unit ( Lake. To marry their daughter, Rachel home located on a private road north of State road 10 again... Was a clearing shot suspect: court said that fact defendant stopped where the wall v.. Firearm and not the CS gas passed by the injured Koby and cain from the garage saw!